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ABSTRACT
One of the hallmarks of a free and fair society is the ability to con-
duct a peaceful and seamless transfer of power from one leader
to another. Democratically, this is measured in a citizen popula-
tion’s trust in the electoral system of choosing a representative
government. In view of the well documented issues of the 2016
US Presidential election, we conducted an in-depth analysis of the
2018 US Midterm elections looking specifically for voter fraud or
suppression. The Midterm election occurs in the middle of a 4 year
presidential term. For the 2018 midterms, 35 Senators and all the 435
seats in the House of Representatives were up for re-election, thus,
every congressional district and practically every state had a federal
election. In order to collect election related tweets, we analyzed
Twitter during the month prior to, and the two weeks following,
the November 6, 2018 election day. In a targeted analysis to detect
statistical anomalies or election interference, we identified several
biases that can lead to wrong conclusions. Specifically, we looked
for divergence between actual voting outcomes and instances of
the #ivoted hashtag on the election day. This analysis highlighted
three states of concern: New York, California, and Texas. We re-
peated our analysis discarding malicious accounts, such as social
bots. Upon further inspection and against a backdrop of collected
general election-related tweets, we identified some confounding
factors, such as population bias, or bot and political ideology infer-
ence, that can lead to false conclusions. We conclude by providing
an in-depth discussion of the perils and challenges of using social
media data to explore questions about election manipulation.
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INTRODUCTION
Inherent bias of drawing conclusions from political polls stretch
back to the famous headline of "Dewey Defeats Truman" in the
1948 US Presidential election [43]. Confounding factors that led to
false conclusions in the 1948 election included telephone surveys
which did not use robust statistical methods and an under-sampling
of Truman supporters. Likewise, in 2016, many political pundits
underestimated the likelihood that Donald Trump would be elected
as President of the United States. The research community demon-
strated a strong interest in studying social media to get a better
understanding of how the 2016 events unfolded. Numerous studies
concluded that social media can be a vehicle for political manipu-
lation, citing factors such as the effect of fake news and disinfor-
mation [5, 9, 28, 29, 33, 46, 49, 51, 55], bots [7, 8, 41, 50, 53, 58, 59],
polarization [3, 6], etc.
Research also suggests that social media data comes with sig-
nificant biases that limit the ability to forecast offline events, e.g.,
the outcomes of political elections [22–26, 38], or public health
issues [2, 36, 57]. Despite these well documented issues and chal-
lenges, social media are frequently relied upon and referred to as a
trusted source of information to speculate about, or try to explain,
offline events. One such example is the recent 2018 US Midterm
elections where widespread claims of voter fraud and voter sup-
pression appeared in the news, often based on social media reports
& accounts.
In this paper, we seek to understand whether it is possible to
use Twitter as a sensor to estimate the expected amount of votes
generated by each state. We propose an undertaking in which we
use the tweets with the hashtag #ivoted on the election day as
a proxy for actual votes. At first, this seemed like a promising
research direction, as tweet volumes and vote counts correlated
well for 47 of the 50 states in America. We also considered if this
would be a useful approach to detecting voting issues like fraud
or suppression, for example by isolating statistical anomalies in
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estimated and observed volumes. To get a sense of expected tweet
volume, we carried out the same analysis against general keywords
related to the midterm election from a month before election day
through two weeks after the election. We also considered how bots
may have had an influence on election manipulation narratives by
measuring their activity in the social media discourse. We finally
applied a political ideology inference technique and tested it to see
how well it compared to an external source of polls data.
The conclusions from our analysis are complex, and this work
is meant as a note of caution about the risks of using social media
analysis to infer political election manipulation such as voter fraud
and voter suppression.
Contributions of this work
After exploring multiple Twitter data sets and two external sources
(vote counts and Gallup), we came to the following contributions:
• We explored how social media analysis carries a lot of risks
involved mainly with population bias, data collection bias,
lack of location-specific data, separation of bots (and orga-
nizations) from humans, information verification and fact-
checking, and lastly assigning political ideology.
• We saw a significant difference in the removal of retweets in
our analysis as compared with including them. However, the
effect was isolated to one particular state, Texas, indicating
that the sensitivity of this effect could be a factor of location.
• There is a significant difference between people’s reported
political ideologies using a source like Gallup versus that
can be inferred on social media. It is not possible to know
if this is due to limitations of political inference algorithms,
confounders, population representation biases, or else.
• In the two states (NY & TX) where there was a statistically
significant discrepancy between vote counts and instances of
self-reported voting via #ivoted hashtags, we found only lim-
ited anecdotal evidence of tweets reporting issues of voter
fraud or suppression. The divergence can possibly be ex-
plained by confounding factors, locality and selection bias,
or social influence of particular candidates in those states
(e.g., Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez in NY and Beto O’Rourke in
TX).
BACKGROUND
The US Midterm elections were held on 6 November, 2018. They are
referred to as mid-term elections because they occur in the middle
of a presidential term. Senators serve for 6 years, thus, every 2 years,
nearly a third of the Senators are up for re-election. The Senate is
divided into 3 classes, depending on which year they were elected.
Class I was elected in 2012 and are up for re-election in 2018.
For 2018, 35 Senators out of a total of 100 senators in the 115th
Congress will be up for re-election. Of the 35 senators up for elec-
tion, 33 are in Senate Class I and two are Senators who vacated,
whereas 15 are in what is to be considered contentious races. The 33
Class I are 30 (23 Democrats (D), 5 Republicans (R), 2 Independents
(I)) up for re-election and 3 Republicans (R) who are retiring. Details
on the Senate seats up for re-election are in Table 1. Additionally,
all 535 House of Representative seats are up for re-election every 2
Table 1: US Senate Seats Up for Election in 2018
Incumbent State Party Status
Tammy Baldwin WI D Contested
John Barraso WY R Safe
Sherrod Brown OH D Contested
Maria Cantrell WA D Safe
Ben Cardin MD D Safe
Tom Carper DE D Safe
Bob Casey PA D Safe
Bob Corker TN R Retiring
Ted Cruz TX R Contested
Joe Donnelly IN D Contested
Dianne Feinstein CA D Safe
Deb Fischer NE R Safe
Jeff Flake AZ R Retiring
Kirsten Gillibrand NY D Safe
Orrin Hatch UT R Retiring
Martin Heinrich NM D Safe
Heidi Heitkamp ND D Contested
Dean Heller NV R Contested
Mazie Hirono HI D Safe
Cindy Hyde-Smith MS R Contested
Tim Kaine VA D Safe
Angus King ME I Safe
Amy Klobuchar MN D Safe
Joe Manchin WV D Contested
Claire McCaskill MO D Contested
Bob Menendez NJ D Contested
Chris Murphy CT D Safe
Bill Nelson FL D Contested
Bernie Sanders VT I Safe
Tina Smith MN D Contested
Debbie Stabenow MI D Safe
Jon Tester MT D Contested
Elizabeth Warren MA D Safe
Sheldon Whitehouse RI D Safe
Roger Wicker MS R Safe
years. Excluded from our analysis are the non-voting delegates for
DC and the US Territories.
RELATEDWORK
Since the 2016 US Presidential election, there has been a big spot-
light on the sovereignty of the US election system. The Bot Dis-
closure and Accountability Act of 20181 gave clear guidelines for
what has to be disclosed by social media companies. The article
The Rise of Social Bots [18] brought awareness to the issue of social
bots in social media platforms. In [7], Bessi & Ferrara focused on
social bots detection within the online discussion related to the
2016 presidential election. Other than characterizing the behavioral
differences between humans and bots, there was not an in-depth
analysis of any malicious intent. In this paper, we address the po-
tential malicious activity in online political discussion along the
lines of voter fraud, voter suppression, political misinformation,
and then report on the biases we found.
1https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/3127/text
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Voting Issues
Concerns related to voter fraud took center stage after the 2000 US
Presidential election, where it was argued that the candidate with
the most votes lost and the Supreme Court decided the winner [39].
Since then, a host of public debate, congressional testimony, and
several new laws passed, such as the Help America Vote Act [34],
which surprisingly needed to happened after the National Voter
Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA).2 The effects of the NVRA were
researched by Highton and Wolfinger [32], who concluded that
provisions in the NVRA would increase voter turnout by 4.7%-8.7%
and that purging voter rolls of those who had not voted in the last
two years would have a 2% effect. Lastly, they identified the two
most vulnerable non-voting groups to be those under the age of 30
and those who moved within 2 years of an election [32].
Moreover, it has been argued that the current US voter registra-
tion has a minimal impact on registration and that there is marginal
value in any updated laws [31]. Therefore, the main concern argued
by both parties is voter suppression [56]. Specifically, due to re-
cent voter identification laws, there is an increased chance of voter
suppression [30]. However, in this work we seek to find instances
of voter suppression from an online social media analysis. To our
knowledge, this has not been done before.
Political Manipulation
Social media serve as convenient platforms for people to connect
and to exchange ideas. However, social media networks like Twitter
and Facebook can be used for malicious purposes [17]. Especially
in the context of political discussion, there is a significant risk
of mass manipulation of public opinion. Concerning the ongoing
investigation of Russian meddling in the 2016 US Presidential elec-
tion, Badawy et al. [4] studied political manipulation by analyzing
the released Russian troll accounts on Twitter. After using label
propagation to assign political ideology, they found that Conserva-
tives retweeted Russian trolls over 30 times more than Liberals and
produced 36 times more tweets. More recently, Stella et al. [52] high-
lighted how bots can play significant roles in targeting influential
humans to manipulate online discussion thus increasing in-fighting.
Especially for the spread of fake news, various studies showed how
political leaning [1], age [28], and education [49] can greatly affect
fake news spread, alongside with other mechanisms that leverage
emotions [20, 21] and cognitive limits [44, 45]. Additionally, Dutt
et al. [16] showed how foreign actors can more so than just backing
one candidate or the other, often manipulate social media for the
purpose of sowing discord.
Bias
Besides manipulation, other potential problems may affect data
originating from online social systems. Selection bias is one such ex-
ample. Concisely, this bias yields a statistically non-representative
sample of the true population. A main concern outlined by Ruths
and Pfeffer [48], and to a lesser degree by Malik et al. [37], is that
social media samples are not representative of the whole voting
population because users self-select to participate on the platform
and in specific online discussions. Each social media platform has
its own set of biases. Mislove et al. [40] looked specifically at the
2https://www.justice.gov/crt/about-national-voter-registration-act
Twitter population from a location, gender, and ethnicity viewpoint.
From a location perspective, they found underrepresented counties
in the Mid-West and over-represented counties in highly dense ur-
ban areas [40]. Biases in the representation of gender [47], ethnicity
[11], and other sources of distortions [13] can also potentially affect
the inference of political ideology.
DATA
In this study, we examine different data sources to investigate and
explore the risk of using social media in the context of political
election manipulation.
We used Twitter as a sensor to estimate the expected amount of
votes generated by each state. For this purpose, we carried out two
data collections. In the first one, we gathered the tweets with the
hashtag #ivoted on election day. The second collection aimed to
enlarge the spectrum to a longer period of time exploiting a variety
of general keywords, related to the midterm election, to collect
the tweets. As a basis for comparison, we employ two external
sources. The United States Election Project is used to unveil the
amount of voters in each state, while Gallup to have an estimate of
the political polarization both at the country level and at the state
level. By means of these three data sources, we assembled five data
sets (DS1-DS5), which will be analyzed in turn in the following
subsections.
DS1: #ivoted Dataset. The #ivoted Dataset (DS1) gathers the tweets
with the hashtag #ivoted generated on the day of the election, No-
vember 6, 2018. It should be noticed that #ivoted was promoted by
Twitter and Instagram—which typically affects the hashtag spread
[19, 54]—to encourage citizens to participate in the midterm elec-
tions and increase the voter turnout. We used the Python module
Twyton to collect tweets through the Twitter Streaming API3 dur-
ing election day. The data collection time window ranged from 6
a.m. EST on November 6 (when the first polling station opened) to
1 a.m. HST on November 7 (2 hours after the last polling station
closed). Overall, we collected 249,106 tweets. As a sanity check, we
queried theOSoMe API provided by Indiana University [14]. OSoMe
tracks the Twitter Decahose, a pseudo-random 10% sample of the
stream, and therefore can provide an estimate of the total volume:
OSoME contains 29.7K tweets with the #ivoted hashtag posted by
27.2K users—it is worth noting that trending topics are typically
slightly over-represented in the Twitter Decahose [14, 42]—by ex-
trapolation, this would suggest an estimated upper bound of the
total volume at around 300K tweets. In addition, on election day,
Twitter reported that the hashtag #ivoted was trending with over
200K tweets (cf. Fig. 1). Having collected 249K such tweets, we can
conclude that we have at our disposal a nearly complete #ivoted
sample dataset.
DS2 & DS3: General Midterm Dataset. In the General Midterm
Dataset, we collect tweets on a broader set of keywords. Further,
we consider two different time windows for the data collection. The
rationale behind these choices is to evaluate the sensitivity of our
study against a different, but correlated, set of data. In other words,
the main purpose is to detect whether any divergence arose with
3Please note that we utilize the same approach for every Twitter data collection
discussed in this work.
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Figure 1: Screen shot of the United States trends on election
day showing the #ivoted hashtag trending with 200K tweets.
the #ivoted Dataset analysis or, on the other hand, to inspect the
consistency of the results in different settings.
Tweets were collected by using the following keywords as a
filter: 2018midtermelections, 2018midterms, elections, midterm, and
midtermelections. We distinguish two data sets according to their
temporal extent. In DS2, we consider only tweets generated on the
election day with exactly the same time window used for DS1. The
third data set (DS3) provides a view of the political discussion from
a wide-angle lens. It includes tweets from the month prior (October
6, 2018) to two weeks after (November 19, 2018) the day of the
election. We kept the collection running after the election day as
several races remained unresolved. As a result, DS3 consists of 2.7
million tweets, whose IDs are publicly available for download.4
DS4: Actual Voting Data. The first external data source used as a
basis of comparison is made available by the United States Election
Project. They report on their website5 the expected voter turnout
per state, along with the (official or certified) information source
and other statistics about voters. The data (DS4) we use in this work
was assessed on November 18, 2018, and reflects a voter turnout of
116,241,100 citizens, which is aligned with other reported counts.
DS5: Party Affiliation Data. To have an assessment of the political
party affiliation across the country, we make use of an evaluation
provided by Gallup, through the Gallup Daily tracking survey, a
system which continuously monitors Americans’ attitudes and be-
haviors.6 The data set (DS5), collected on January 22, 2019, depicts
the political leaning over a sample size of 180,106 citizens. In partic-
ular, the data shows the percentage of Democratic and Republican
population in each state and over the entire country. Gallup’s eval-
uation shows that, at the national level, there exists a democratic
4https://github.com/A-Deb/midterms
5http://www.electproject.org/2018g
6https://www.gallup.com/174155/gallup-daily-tracking-methodology.aspx
Table 2: Datasets Statistics
Statistic DS1 DS2 DS3
# of Tweets 90,763 20,450 452,288
# of Retweets 146,546 54,866 1,869,313
# of Replies 11,797 6,730 267,973
# of Authors 174,854 72,022 977,996
# of Users 178,503 77,749 997,406
advantage (7%), as 45% of the population is assessed as democratic
leaning while 38% is estimated as republican.
Data Pre-processing
Data pre-processing involved only Twitter data sets and consisted
of three main steps. First, we removed any duplicate tweet, which
may have been captured by accidental duplicate queries to the
Twitter API. Then, we excluded from our analysis all the tweets not
written in English language. Despite the majority of the tweets were
in English, and to a very lesser degree in Spanish (3,177 tweets), we
identified about 59 languages in the collected tweets. Finally, we
inspected tweets from other countries and removed them as they
were out of the context of this study. In particular, we filtered out
tweets related to the Cameroon election (October 7, 2018), to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo presidential election (December
23, 2018), to the Biafra call for Independence (#biafra, #IPOB), to
democracy in Kenya (#democracyKE), to the two major political
parties in India (BJP and UPA), and to college midterm exams.
Overall, we count for almost 3 millions tweets distributed over
the three Twitter data sets (DS1-DS3). In Table 2, we report some
aggregate statistics. It should be noticed that the number of authors
is lower than the number of users, which in turn also includes ac-
counts that got a retweet (or reply) of a tweet that was not captured
in our collection and, thus, they do not appear as authors.
METHODOLOGY
State Identification
The usage of geo-tagged tweets to assign a state to each user has
been shown to not be effective, being the fraction of geo-tagged
tweets around 0.5% [12]. The location of the data is of utmost
importance, especially at the state and local level. However, less
than 1% of the collected tweets have been geo-tagged. Nevertheless,
we aim to map as many users as possible to a US state, to conduct
a state by state comparison. For this purpose, we leveraged tweet
metadata, which may include the self-reported user profile location.
The location entry is a user-generated string (up to 100 characters),
and it is pulled from the user profile metadata for every tweet. From
this field, we first search for the two-letter capitalized state codes,
followed by the full name of the state. Our analysis does not include
Washington, D.C., so we have to ensure anything initially labeled
Washington does not include any variant of DC. Using this string-
search method, we managed to assign a state to approximately
50% of the tweets and 30% of the users. Some users had multiple
states over their tweet history, thus, we only used the most common
reported state. A few users often switched their location from a
state name to something else: for example, one user went from
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New York, NY to Vote Blue!—for such users, we kept the valid state
location.
Bot Detection
Bot detection has received ample attention [18] and increasingly
sophisticated techniques keep emerging [35]. In this study, we
restrict our bot detection analysis to the use of the widely popular
Botometer,7 developed by Indiana University. The underpinnings
of the system were first published in [15, 53] and further revised
in [59]. Botometer is based on an ensemble classifier [10] fed by
over 1,000 features related to the Twitter account under analysis
and extracted through the Twitter API. Botometer aims to provide
an indicator, namely bot score, that is used to classify an account
either as a bot or as a human. The lower the bot score, the higher
the probability that the user is not an automated and/or controlled
account. In this study we use version v3 of Botometer, which brings
some innovations and important detailed in [59]—e.g., the bot scores
are now rescaled and not centered around 0.5 anymore.
In Figure 2, we depict the bot score distribution of the 1,131,540
distinct users in our datasets. The distribution exhibits a right skew:
most of the probability mass is in the range [0, 0.2] and some peaks
can be noticed around 0.3. Prior studies used the 0.5 threshold to sep-
arate humans from bots. However, according to the re-calibration
introduced in the latest version of Botometer [59], along with the
emergence of increasingly more sophisticated bots, we here lower
the bot score threshold to 0.3 (i.e., a user is labeled as a bot if the bot
score is above 0.3). This threshold corresponds to the same level of
sensitivity setting of 0.5 in prior versions of Botometer (cf. Fig 5 in
[59]). In both DS1 and DS3, 21.1% of the users have been classified
as bots, while in DS2 the percentage achieves the 22.9% of the users.
Finally, 19.5% of the 295,352 users for which a State was identified
have been scored as bots.
Overall, Botometer did not return a score for 42,904 accounts,
which corresponds to 3.8% of the users. To further examine this
subset of users, wemake use of the Twitter API. Interestingly, 99% of
these accounts were suspended by Twitter, whereas the remaining
1% were protected (by privacy settings). For the users with an
assigned location, only 1,033 accounts did not get a Botometer
score. For those users, we assume that the accounts suspended
(1,019) are bots and the private accounts (14) are humans.
Statistical Vote Comparison
Once the states have been identified and the bots detected, we
compared the distribution of our various Twitter datasets (DS1,
DS2, and DS3) with our control data in DS4 and DS5. To do this,
we start by counting the number of tweets per state and dividing
it by the total number of tweets across all states. We denote this
fractional share in terms of tweets as State Tweet Rate (STR), for
each state i as
STR (i ) =
no. tweets from State i∑50
j no. tweets from State j
(1)
For the actual voter data (DS4), we perform a similar metric to
determine the State Vote Rate (SVR) of each state i as
7https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu/
Figure 2: Bot Score Distribution
SVR (i ) =
no. votes from State i∑50
j no. votes from State j
(2)
We then calculate the difference δ (i ) for each state i . Here it is
important to note that any positive value indicates more tweets
than votes, as a percentage, and vice versa:
δ (i ) = STR (i ) − SVR (i ) (3)
Lastly, we convert the difference into standard deviations s (i )
(stdevs) by dividing δ (i ) by the standard deviation of all differences:
s (i ) =
δ (i )√∑
(δ (i )−δ )
50
(4)
being δ the average difference over all states. We then inspect
the results for any anomalous state i whose standard deviation
|s (i ) | ≥ 2. States beyond two standard deviations are worth further
inspection.
Political Ideology Inference
We classify users by their ideology based on the political leaning of
the media outlets they share. We use lists of partisan media outlets
compiled by third-party organizations, such as AllSides8 and Media
Bias/Fact Check.9 We combine liberal and liberal-center media
outlets into one list and conservative and conservative-center into
another. The combined list includes 641 liberal and 398 conservative
outlets. However, in order to cross reference these media URLs with
the URLs in the Twitter dataset, we need to get the expanded URLs
for most of the links in the dataset, since most of them are shortened.
As this process is quite time-consuming, we get the top 5,000 URLs
by popularity and then retrieve the long version for those. These
top 5,000 URLs account for more than 254K, or more than 1/3 of
all the URLs in the dataset. After cross-referencing the 5,000 long
URLs with the media URLs, we observe that 32,115 tweets in the
dataset contain a URL that points to one of the liberal media outlets
and 25,273 tweets with a URL pointing to one of the conservative
media outlets. We use a polarity rule to label Twitter users as liberal
or conservative depending on the number of tweets they produce
8https://www.allsides.com/media-bias/media-bias-ratings
9https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/
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with links to liberal or conservative sources. In other words, if a
user has more tweets with URLs to liberal sources, he/she is labeled
as liberal and vice versa. Although the overwhelming majority
of users include URLs that are either liberal or conservative, we
remove any user that has equal number of tweets from each side.
Our final set of labeled users includes 38,920 users.
To classify the remaining accounts as liberal or conservative, we
use label propagation, similar to prior work [4]. For this purpose,
we construct a retweet network, containing nodes (Twitter users)
with a direct link between them if one user retweet a post of another.
To validate results of the label propagation algorithm, we apply
stratified cross (5-fold) validation to a set of more than 38,920 seeds.
We train the algorithm on 4/5 of the seed list and see how it performs
on the remaining 1/5. Both precision and recall scores are around
0.89. Since we combine liberal and liberal-center into one list (same
for conservatives), we can see that the algorithm is not only labeling
the far liberal or conservative correctly, which is a relatively easier
task, but it is performing well on the liberal/conservative center
as well. Overall, we find that the liberal users population is almost
three times larger the conservative counterpart (73% vs. 27%).
RESULTS
#ivoted (DS1) Statistical Analysis
There were 249,106 tweets in the #ivoted data set, of those we
could map a state location for 78,162 unique authors. Once we
remove the 15,856 bots (using a bot threshold score of 0.3), we have
62,306 remaining authors of tweets and retweets. After applying
the method described in Statistical Vote Comparison section, we see
that three states show an anomalous behavior from the remaining
47 states. Figure 4a shows how New York is 5.8 standard deviations
greater than the mean difference between the #ivoted percentage
and the actual voting percentage. Furthermore, both California and
Texas have a stdev 2.2 greater than the mean. This would lead to
believe that if there was voter suppression, it would most likely be
in these three states, as they exhibit significantly more self-reported
voting tweets than vote counts.
However, since our data set has both tweets and retweets, to
check the sensitivity of our findings, we repeated our analysis with-
out the retweets. Once removed, the 34,754 remaining tweets, again
without bots, we noticed something interesting. Not only did Texas
drop from 2.2 stdevs to 0.4 stdevs, but New York increased from
5.8 stdevs to 6.3 stdevs. This highlights the sensitivity our this type
of analysis to location-specific factors such as state, and informa-
tion dynamic factors such as retweet filtering. Further inspection
showed that 62.2% of the tweet activity in Texas (in the #ivoted data
set) was based on retweets, highlighting how this class of tweet can
produce different results for some populations, and similar ones
for others, since the average across the states stayed at 0 (e.g., see
Figure 4b).
General Midterm (DS2&DS3) Statistical Analysis
We carried out the same analysis against the general keywords data
set both on election day (DS2) and for a month before to two weeks
after the election (DS3).
Figure 3: Political ideology difference, in terms of percent-
age of liberals vs. conservatives, between DS5 and DS3
In DS2, we have 72,022 users, from which we filtered out 16,859
bots (using a bot threshold of 0.3). From the remaining 55,163 au-
thors, we were able to map a state for 26,081 users. Performing the
same comparative analysis from before, we found the same anom-
alies in the same three states: CA (1.6 stdev), TX (2.8 stdev), and NY
(5.6 stdev). Visually, this can be appreciated in Figure 4c. Expanding
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the analysis to DS3, we removed 206,831 users, as classified as bots,
from the set of 977,966 authors. This left us with 771,135 users from
which we could identify a state for 295,705 of them. The statistical
analysis revealed the same outliers also in this data set: CA (2.8
stdev), TX (3.1 stdev), and NY (4.7 stdev), as can been seen in Figure
4d.
Bot Sensitivity
Next, we investigate whether discarding malicious accounts, such
as social bots, from the set of users may have affected the findings
above. Table 4 shows the number (and percentage) of bots and
humans per state in DS3. The list of states is sorted (in descending
order) according to the percentage of bots, while the horizontal
line separates the states with a bots percentage above and below
the average (20.3%). Note in particular that all the three outliers (in
bold) have values below the average. However, the distribution of
bot prevalence per state varies greatly and it should be analyzed
taking into account both the state population size and the number
of Twitter users per state. Highly populated states like California,
Texas, and New York, have large sheer numbers of bots but low
proportional bot percentage. This should be taken into account
when drawing conclusions from this analysis. On the other side, this
topic opens the way to further discussions about bots association
with a given state. One could make the argument that if the account
was identified as a bot, there is no point to assigning it to a state.
However, the fact that automated accounts declare a location in
their profile can be viewed as a malicious strategy to embed in the
social system thus, it should be prudently examined.
For these reasons, we repeated our analysis including social
bots in the users set. Results with or without bots are substantially
unchanged. In the interest of space, we do not duplicate the maps
shown in Figure 4, but the same anomalies are revealed if bots
are retained. It should be noticed that also for the #ivoted dataset
(DS1), the percentage of bots in the three outlier states are below the
average (21.0%), NY (16.0%), CA (19.4%) and TX (20.2%), respectively.
Political Ideology Analysis
Next we examine what topics talk about and how they address po-
litically charged topics. Table 3 shows the top 10 hashtags discussed
respectively by humans and bots, for both liberal and conserva-
tive ideologies. The hashtags have been colored to show the com-
mon topics between bots and humans for each political wing. The
amount of overlap between bots and humans hashtags is noticeable.
This is likely the reason why the removal of bots from the analyzed
accounts did not have any significant impact on our outcome. To
carefully interpret this table, it should be noticed that the liberal
group is almost three times larger than the conservative one, as we
stated in Political Ideology section.
Additionally, we took our political ideology labels by state and
compared with DS5, the Gallup poll survey. As mentioned before,
the political ideology inference assigned 73% liberal labels and
27% conservative labels to the nation at a whole. That compares
with Gallup reporting of 45% to 38% for the Nation as a whole.
At the state level, we ran a comparison to see the difference in
our assessment of political leaning of a state versus Gallup’s. For
example, Alabama is 35% liberal and 50% conservative, according to
Table 3: Top 10 hashtags: liberals, conservatives, humans,
bots
Top 10 Hashtags
Liberal Conservative
Bots
#BlueWave #BrowardCounty
#VoteBlue #MAGA
#MAGA #Broward
#NovemberisComing #RedWave
#TheResistance #VoteRedToSaveAmerica
#Democrats #StopTheSteal
#Trump #VoteRed
#vote #Democrats
#Florida #Redwavepolls
#GOTV #WednesdayWisdom
Humans
#NovemberisComing #BrowardCounty
#VoteBlue #Broward
#BlueWave #MAGA
#vote #IranRegime
#txlege #Tehran
#electionday #StopTheSteal
#Russia #RedWave
#unhackthevote #PalmBeachCounty
#AMJoy #Redwavepolls
#Trump #Florida
Gallup, giving the state a marked Republican advantage. However,
in Twitter we observed 42% Liberal and 31% Conservative user
labels, which may suggest the opposite trend. Figure 3 shows the
difference between the Gallup poll and our analysis. For Alabama
going from a Republican advantage of 15% (Gallup) to a Democratic
advantage of 11% (Twitter) would imply a shift of 26 percent points
toward the liberal side. Overall, every state showed movement
toward the left, as low as a few percent points and as high as over
60% difference. This corroborates the suspect that left-leaning users
are over-represented in our data.
Voting Issues
New York was the state that exhibited the strongest statistical anom-
aly. Thus, we conducted a manual inspection reading all tweets
originating from there. We found no red flags, but we isolated a few
tweets of interest. The first one is in Figure 5 and it is from a user
who was classified as a human and from inspection of the account
shown to live in New York. The user mentions some important
issues: at 11:20 am on the day of the election, they found out they
are the victim of voter fraud. There is no information to suggests
this was resolved in any meaningful way or if the accusation is
substantiated.
A second example of potential voter issue was found after a
manual inspection of the tweets in New York. The tweet thread in
Figure 6 is heavily redacted, but it shows an ongoing conversation
through replies and it shows multiple people presenting multiple
sides. The original tweet was actually posted on 5 November, 2018
and by the time of our viewing had received a significant number
of retweets. It is from this original tweet that we see a reply where
the user is complaining that they can not get to the voting booth
without a photo ID. User 3 then asks for the name and number of the
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(a) #ivoted vs. Actual Votes (b) #ivoted (w/o RTs) vs. Actual Votes
(c) General (election) vs. Actual Votes (d) General (overall w/o RTs vs. Actual Votes
Figure 4: Various datasets versus Actual Votes (DS4) all without bots
Figure 5: #ivoted tweet from New York
community and then User 4 provides an election hotline number.
This indicates that many people today are willing to speculate on
Twitter, but nothing seems to indicate that they also were going to
the official Department of Justice website to file a complaint.
From our inspection other tweets that are noteworthy include:
(1) "First time voter in my family registered over a month ago on
DMV website online not realizing it’s not automated. . . she
could not vote. Not right."
(2) "More voter fraud in Ohio. Why is it that all the errors are
always the Democrats?? Because the only way they can win
is if they cheat!! This madness needs to stop."
(3) What we did see in our Twitter collection is early skepti-
cism that there would be false claims of voter fraud. A user
tweeted "a little over 24 hours from now the Racist in Chief
will start Tweeting about rigged elections, voter fraud and
illegal aliens voting en mass...".
Figure 6: #ivoted tweet from Florida
(4) Shortly afterwards, many people started to retweet a user
that stated "Massive voter fraud in Texas Georgia Florida
and others" and also indicating that MSM (main stream
media) are putting out fake polls. The Washington Post
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@washingtonpost tweeted "without evidence, Trump and
Sessions warn of voter fraud" which was retweeted through-
out election day.
(5) There was a user who tweeted about voting machine mal-
functions which mapped to a story/blog from the Atlanta
Journal Constitution (https://t.com/riCGdbwQ6R) about ma-
chines being down; people left and were encouraged to come
back. There was an offer for casting a paper provisional bal-
lot, but many said they did not trust the paper ballot and
wanted to vote on a machine.
DISCUSSION & RECOMMENDATIONS
Our results have highlighted the challenges of using social media
in election manipulation analysis. A superficial interpretation of
anomalies in online activity compared to real world data can lead to
misleading or false conclusions. In our case, wewanted to determine
the feasibility of using social media as a sensor to detect election
manipulation such as widespread voter suppression or voter fraud.
While we did not find widespread or systematic manipulation, we
learned a few lessons worthy of a discussion:
• Data biases of online platforms can drastically affect the
feasibility of a study. In our case, we were looking for a rep-
resentative sample of actual voters who are not bots and
whose political ideology and location could be known. De-
spite troves of data were collected and analyzed, various
encountered biases could not be adjusted for.
• The second main issue is consistency in the analysis: the
sensitivity to choices made when carrying out data clean-
ing, parameter settings of inference algorithms, etc. yield
a so-called garden of forking paths [27]: some results can
significantly vary in function of such choices (for example,
location bias and the removal or retention of retweets played
a role in determining whether Texas exhibited a statistical
anomaly in terms of expected versus cast votes).
• Political ideologies reported by Gallup significantly vary
with respect to that can be inferred on social media. We
were unable to determine if this is due to limitations of the
employed political inference tool, population biases, or other
factors. This is an open problem in social media analysis and
a necessary one to tackle before social media can be used to
robustly replace polling.
• The actual voting numbers reported by official sources cor-
related very closely to what we inferred from our analysis
on Twitter for 47 of 50 states. As such, the approach seemed
promising to identify voter suppression or fraud. However,
the results show a more complex picture: no evidence of
fraud or suppression beyond anecdotal was found in the
three anomalous states under scrutiny. Yet, we suggest that
prior and during elections there should be an online social
media presence for the Department of Justice to engage with
people who have a potential voting issue.
CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this work, we conducted an investigation to analyze social media
during the 2018 US Midterm election. In addition to studying bots
and the political ideology of users, we studied the correlation be-
tween people talking about voting and actual voter data. We then
highlighted a few issues that could lead to inaccurate conclusions.
In particular, removing or retaining the bots didn’t change the out-
come of our results. This was not the case in prior studies. However,
in our case, removing retweets did make a significant difference for
one state, Texas, suggesting a dependency, or bias, on location.
The challenges we faced can all be expanded upon in future work.
We only mapped a state to 44.7% of DS1 and 30.2% to DS2/DS3. If
we can evaluate a user timeline to better recognize what state they
may be from that would enhance future location based studies. Our
political ideology inference started with the labeling of 38K users
leveraging any link they posted, and then labels were propagated
on the retweet network. We could potentially identify the users
with high centrality and evaluate their timeline for party affiliation
and approach the inference problem from a different angle. We
could also focus on separating not just human from bot accounts,
but also human from corporate accounts. Some of the users that
were classified as human could be operating as part of a collective
body, that while not necessarily malicious, may insert an inorganic
bias.
Ultimately, one of the goals of this work was to explore the fea-
sibility of using social media as a sensor to detect possible election
manipulation at scale: despite our initial effort did not produce
the expected results, we highlighted some useful lessons that will
illuminate on future endeavors to use such data for social good.
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